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THE NEED FOR A TWO (OR MORE) TIERED FIRST
AMENDMENT TO PROVIDE FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN
KEVIN W. SAUNDERS*
Amitai Etzioni recognizes two distinct problems in protecting
children from harmful influences in the media.1 The first is found in
cases involving what he calls the spillover effect. This is the constitu-
tional infirmity present in many of the attempts to limit the access of
minors to material that may legitimately be denied them. For exam-
ple, Ginsberg v. New York established that states may prohibit the
distribution of pornographic material to children, even if that material
is not obscene for an adult audience. 2 But if the regulation also limits
the access of adults to that material, there is a constitutional violation
of the "spillover" variety.' The second problem is found in attempts
to shield children from material that seems more clearly to enjoy First
Amendment protection (no matter the audience), the most important
example being depictions of violence.4
I. SPILLOVER CASES
Spillover violations have been found in the attempts to limit
youth access to sexually indecent material on the Internet. Both the
Communications Decency Act ("CDA")5 and the Child Online Pro-
tection Act ("COPA")6 were aimed at legitimate goals but unconsti-
tutionally limited adult access.7 Both address access to material that
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University-Detroit College of Law. A.B., Franklin &
Marshall College; M.S., M.A., Ph.D., University of Miami; J.D., University of Michigan.
1. Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3 (2004).
2. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
3. The earliest such case is Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. The CDA was enacted as Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 133-43 (codified at various sections of Titles 18 and 47).
6. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736 to 2681-741 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231
(2000)).
7. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that CDA is unconstitutional);
ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiffs established a substantial
likelihood that COPA is unconstitutional).
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minors would be unable to obtain in a magazine store but which is
readily available on the Internet. If access were limited through a
method that had no effect on adult consumption, the statutes could
have been held constitutional, but the restrictions spilled over into the
adult world.
The most recent unsuccessful attempt to limit the exposure of
children to tobacco advertising may also be seen to have suffered
from a spillover effect in the context of commercial speech in Loril-
lard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly.8 Massachusetts' restrictions on tobacco
advertising on billboards anywhere within one thousand feet of a
school or public playground were struck down because they were too
restrictive. 9 While tobacco products cannot be sold to children, and
ads aimed at children can be banned, the billboard restriction would
have banned such ads in approximately 90 percent of Boston, Spring-
field, and Worcester, Massachusetts. 10 Adults would have been cut off
from information about products they may legally consume.
Spillover problems are resolved, to the extent that they can be
resolved, by more closely tailoring the restrictions to the legitimate
targets. Dawn Nunziato's article offers a thorough examination of the
case law growing out of attempts to regulate the Internet.11 As she
indicates, the care taken in designing the protections is key. She holds
out hope that a filtering system can be developed that can protect
children from the sexual content of the Internet.
A more recent effort at providing a child-safe zone on the Inter-
net may be found in the Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act
of 2002.12 The act provides for a subdomain within the United States
country domain. The domain ".kids.us" would contain only material
suitable for children. The creation of this new, limited forum should
not raise constitutional problems. The Court in Reno v. ACLU3 re-
fused to accept the government's claim that the CDA was a zoning
regulation of the Internet because the act affected the entire Internet.
The Dot Kids Act calls for a partitioning that provides a safe zone for
children while leaving other parts of the Internet open for communi-
cation more suitable for adults. The difficulty with the Dot Kids Act
8. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
9. Id. at 562.
10. Id.
11. Dawn Nunziato, Toward a Constitutional Regulation of Minors' Access to Harmful
Internet Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 121 (2004).
12. Pub. L. No. 107-317, 116 Stat. 2766 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 941 (2000)).
13. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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is that the new subdomain is likely to become solely the province of
Disney and Nickelodeon. A zone with such content would be valu-
able for younger children, but if older children are limited to the kids'
domain, they will lose access to material that may have value to them.
Protection of older children is left to filtering devices that are inade-
quate for the task. White-list or black-list filters that operate either on
a list of acceptable or unacceptable sites quickly lose currency as new
sites are added to the Web or sites change their content. Filters that
examine content for strings of letters may filter too much, barring
access to sites discussing breast cancer or where a word like "Essex"
contains the string "sex." Filters are also currently unable to screen
for the sort of images that are of the most concern where children are
involved.
I have offered, elsewhere, a solution to the problem of children
and the Internet that treats the Internet just as well as the print media
but still provides some protection for children.14 When a news dealer
is confronted with a minor wishing to purchase a magazine, the mer-
chant, if he is aware of the content, must make a determination as to
whether the material is suitable for minors. Internet content providers
can be put to the same task; in fact, it is a less onerous task, since the
content provider is more cognizant of content than the news dealer.
My proposal is that all software used to post to the Internet pro-
vide an option under which the e-mail sender, poster to a bulletin
board, or Web publisher can choose to make the material available to
children or accept the default setting that the content contain a signal
activating a filtering program. The content provider can put any legal
material on the Internet and adult-to-adult communication is unaf-
fected. If the material contains the signal, and a child's parents have
compatible filtering software, the child will be shielded. If parents
choose not to activate a filter, they can let the child receive the mate-
rial others may find objectionable. Liability for the content provider
would attach only when a provider places on the Internet, and asserts
that it is acceptable for children, adequately defined sexual material
predominantly appealing to the prurient interest of minors, patently
offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole
14. See Kevin W. Saunders, Electronic Indecency: Protecting Children in the Wake of the
Cable and Internet Cases, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 1 (1997). Although the article was written several
years ago, later cases do not pose any problems not addressed therein. In fact, a recent case
eliminated the greatest difficulty that did exist at the time of the article. See infra notes 16-19
and accompanying text.
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with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and lacking seri-
ous literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. 5
The best criticism of this suggestion, and a problem for any at-
tempt to regulate the Internet, has recently been answered by the
Supreme Court. In Ashcroft v. ACLU,"6 the Court addressed the
community standards portion of the test for sexual obscenity and its
extension to "harmful-to-minors" statutes." While a video or maga-
zine dealer can choose not to stock material that would go beyond
standards prevailing in the community, when material is placed on the
Web, it is available everywhere. The Court did not see this as a prob-
lem for regulation. The plurality said that those concerned that their
material may be patently offensive in certain communities should not
publish in a way that is accessible to those communities, and should
either forego Web publishing or place their material behind adult
identification screens.' Concurrences by Justices O'Connor and
Breyer said that the test should be based on the standards of the elec-
tronic community. 19
The Dot Kids Act's approach can serve to protect younger chil-
dren, at an age where the Internet is most likely to be a source of en-
tertainment. Older children may be protected by these other means.
Certainly those who would assert the right of older children to a wide
open Internet will object. But the law allows society to protect at least
those under seventeen from strongly sexual material. These older
children will have developing informational interests in the material
available on the Internet, and the scheme suggested would allow ac-
cess to material with value, while protecting children from the sexual
images many find objectionable for minors.
The suggestion by Emily Buss that regulating the Internet can in-
crease access for children is interesting. 20 It does seem likely that at
least some parents who would not allow their children Internet access
in an unprotected environment will allow freer access under a regime
providing protection. They may allow their children open access in
15. The prohibition is similar to the "harmful-to-minors" statute at issue in Ginsberg and to
the regulations contained in the CDA and COPA. Issues regarding links and non-U.S. sites are
addressed in Saunders, supra note 14.
16. 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
17. Id. at 574.
18. Id. at 583.
19. Id. at 586-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 589-91 (Breyer, J., concurring).
20. See Emily Buss, The Speech Enhancing Effect of Internet Regulation, 79 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 103 (2004).
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the ".kids.us" domain, and they may allow their older children access
more generally if there is effective filtering. Thus, in Buss's view, limi-
tation can be of benefit not in the sense of protecting children from
media influences, but in an information-enhancing way.
It may also be the case that limitations closely tailored to suffi-
ciently protect children without limiting adult access increase the
tolerance of society for adult free expression. It is at least an
interesting coincidence that in the era since the Ginsberg decision, the
incidence of prosecution for adult distribution of obscene materials
has declined to the point where Cass Sunstein considers the
likelihood of such prosecution extremely small.21 Ginsberg allowed
society to protect children from material that some see as harmful to
them, while still allowing adult access. If availability to minors had to
mirror availability to adults, it is questionable whether society would
have developed the tolerant position it has with regard to adult
expression.
The Lorillard case shows that some spillover effect is allowed in
the effort to protect children. While the Court found the restrictions
unconstitutional, it was because they were too broad an approach to
what the Court recognized to be a substantial governmental interest.
The Court agreed that reducing the exposure of youth to tobacco
advertising would decrease youth smoking, but the billboard bans
went too far.22 As for other limitations, the Court said, "To the extent
that studies have identified particular advertising and promotion
practices that appeal to youth, tailoring would involve targeting those
practices while permitting others." 23 The Food and Drug Administra-
tion has identified such practices, finding that the research literature
shows color advertisements increase attention and recall beyond
black and white formats.24 Additionally, pictures were found to in-
crease an ad's ability to communicate quickly and memorably, and to
provide a way to communicate with youth and the functionally illiter-
ate. 2 Since color and pictorial ads are particular risks for minors, limi-
tations on such ads may not suffer from spillover effect, even though
adults also would only see black and white, text only billboard ads.
21. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 210 (1993).
22. Id. at 557-61.
23. Id. at 563.
24. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44467 (Food & Drug Admin. Aug. 28,
1996).
25. Id.
20041
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II. SPEECH AFFORDED FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR
MINORS
A. Violence
Etzioni argues that violent depictions are a greater harm than
sexual depictions, while at the same time they are less regulated. The
fact that there is less restriction on access by minors to violent materi-
als, even though there is more research that shows it is harmful, has to
do with the First Amendment status of sex and of violence. Suffi-
ciently explicit or provocative sexual material may be denied to mi-
nors, while violence has been viewed as enjoying First Amendment
protection. Since violence is available to minors, there is a subject
base for research on the effects of violence. While it cannot be said
that minors have no access to sexual material, the law, and ethical
concerns, prevent experiments in which minors are exposed to sexual
material in the course of a study.
Marjorie Heins takes issue with Etzioni's belief that violence in
the media does any harm to children, arguing that there is no basis to
conclude that such images cause increased violence in the real world.26
While Colin Macleod argues that the shielding of children from media
influences need not be limited to material that can be shown to cause
harm but can reach material that is unsettling,27 a category that could
include violence, the best response to Heins is simply to note the con-
clusion of the scientific community on this issue. If she is correct in
her claim that Etzioni fails to understand the social science, Etzioni is
at least in good company. Six major professional organizations in the
health field have found the science conclusive. In a joint July, 2000
statement, the American Psychological Association, the American
Academy of Pediatrics, the American Academy of Child and Adoles-
cent Psychiatry, the American Medical Association, the American
Academy of Family Physicians, and the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation concluded that "well over 1,000 studies... point overwhelm-
ingly to a causal connection between media violence and aggressive
26. See Marjorie Heins, On Protecting Children-From Censorship: A Reply to Amitai
Etzioni, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229 (2004).
27. See Colin M. Macleod, A Liberal Theory of Freedom of Expression for Children, 79
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 55 (2004).
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behavior in some children. '2 The American Academy of Pediatrics,
in an earlier policy statement, said: "The vast majority of studies con-
clude that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between media vio-
lence and real-life violence. '29 The Academy said that the link is
"undeniable and uncontestable."30 A representative of the pediatrics
group also testified before the United States Senate Commerce
Committee that there are now more than 3500 studies on the rela-
tionship between media violence and real world violence, that "[a]ll
but 18 have shown a positive correlation between media exposure and
violent behavior," and that epidemiological studies conclude that
"exposure to violent media was a factor in half of the 10,000 homi-
cides committed in the United States in the [year studied]. '31
The view of the scientific community is that the debate is over
and that there is a connection between media violence and real world
aggression. The Surgeon General's report, Youth Violence, noted that
ethical considerations prevent using the sort of randomized studies
best used to establish causation, but concluded that "a diverse body of
research provides strong evidence that exposure to violence in the
media can increase children's aggressive behavior in the short term. '32
While less secure in finding a long-term causal connection, the report
finds a "small but statistically significant impact on aggression over
many years. ' 33 The scientific community has reached a conclusion
contested primarily by strong civil libertarians and the media industry
itself. The existence of a few scientists who disagree does not weaken
that conclusion any more than a few tobacco industry scientists weak-
ened the developing realization that cigarettes cause cancer or than
the protestations of creation scientists refuted the scientific commu-
nity's acceptance of evolution as scientific theory.
While I disagree with Heins's treatment of the science in the
area, I do agree with her that the science may be inadequate to meet
28. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics et al., Joint Statement on the Impact of Entertainment Vio-
lence on Children (July 26, 2000), available at http://www.aap.org/advocacy/releases/jstmtevc.
htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
29. American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Communications, Media Violence, 95
PEDIATRICS 949, 949 (1995).
30. Id.
31. Donald E. Cook, M.D., Testimony of the American Academy of Pediatrics on Media
Violence Before the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee (Sept. 13, 2000), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/0913coo.pdf (last visited Sept. 12,2003).
32. YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, App. 4-B at 4 (2001),
available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence/chapter4/appendix4bsec3.html
(last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
33. Id. at s 1.
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the strict scrutiny required to limit speech that would otherwise be
protected by the First Amendment. If strong violence, unlike strong
sex, is protected, a restriction on access by minors requires a compel-
ling governmental interest and that the restriction be necessary to, or
narrowly tailored to, that interest. Courts have been willing to accept
the claim that the physical and psychological well-being of youth is a
compelling governmental interest, but the failure of the science to
identify precisely what sort of image leads to increased violence has
caused restrictions to fail the narrow tailoring requirement.34 Scien-
tists cannot do the sort of experiment the courts seem to want; chil-
dren cannot be placed into experimental and control groups and be
shown only one sort of image to determine the effect of that image.
There is, however, the possibility that a statute limited to violent,
or perhaps only to first person shooter, video games would not suffer
from this weakness. Since playing a video game includes watching
images, the science on the more passive media is relevant. In addition,
there is good reason to believe that the more active, interactive na-
ture of video games would strengthen the effect.
Judge Richard Posner rejected the contention that interactivity
makes violent video games more dangerous, arguing that the distinc-
tion between interactive video games and passive media is "superfi-
cial":
Maybe video games are different. They are, after all, interactive.
But this point is superficial, in fact erroneous. All literature (here
broadly defined to include movies, television, and the other photo-
graphic media, and popular as well as highbrow literature) is inter-
active; the better it is, the more interactive. Literature when it is
successful draws the reader into the story, makes him identify with
the characters, invites him to judge them and quarrel with them, to
experience their joys and sufferings as the reader's own.35
But this response really confuses two different uses of the word
"interactive." The sort of literary interaction Judge Posner relies on is
really nothing more than some sort of reader empathy with a charac-
ter. This is far different from interactivity in the sense of participation
in the action. It is the difference between being in the audience for a
play and being on stage. While an actor really interacts with others in
the cast, the audience is only moved by the portrayals presented. The
interactivity of a flight simulator is a completely different experience
34. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 773 F. Supp. 1275 (W.D. Mo. 1991),
affd, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992).
35. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
[Vol 79:257
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from, and one more likely to lead to a response in actual flight than,
reading a flight manual or a book written by a pilot.36
While the scientific evidence specific to video games is just be-
ginning to accumulate, Craig Anderson and Karen Dill have com-
pleted a comparison of aggressiveness-producing effects of violent
video games.3 7 They conclude that the combination of correlational
and laboratory results supports the existence of a causal relation-
ship.38 They also believe violent video games to be of more concern
than violence in television or film because of the active nature of the
games and player identification with the game aggressor. 39 "In a
sense, violent video games provide a complete learning environment
for aggression, with simultaneous exposure to modeling, reinforce-
ment, and rehearsal of behaviors. This combination of learning
strategies has been shown to be more powerful than any of these
methods used singly." 40
Even if one remains skeptical regarding the psychological studies
on causation, there are special dangers to be found in the training
provided to children by violent video games. Lt. Col. Dave Grossman,
who taught psychology at the United States Military Academy, com-
pares video games played by children with similar electronics-based
military training.41 He notes that electronics-based training increased
the number of soldiers willing to fire their weapons at the enemy from
20-25 percent in World War II to 90-95 percent in the Vietnam
War,42 demonstrating that simulation increases the willingness to kill.
36. Even accepting Judge Posner's point as to the interactivity of good literature or film,
the argument that violent video games are particularly dangerous still holds. A difference in
identification through participation may make an experience more likely to produce aggression.
Studies show that subjects who identify with a media aggressor are more likely to become ag-
gressive than subjects not so instructed. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson & Karen E. Dill, Video
Games and Aggressive Thoughts, Feelings, and Behavior in the Laboratory and in Life, 78 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 772, 788 (2000) (citing Jacques-Phillipe Leyens & Steve Picus,
Identification with the Winner of a Fight and Name Mediation: Their Differential Effects upon
Subsequent Aggressive Behavior, 12 BRIT. J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 374 (1973)).
37. Id. at 772.
38. Id. at 787.
39. Id. at 788.
40. Id. (citations omitted).
41. See DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO
KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY (1995); DAVE GROSSMAN & GLORIA DEGAETANO, STOP
TEACHING OUR KIDS TO KILL: A CALL TO ACTION AGAINST TV, MOVIE & VIDEO GAME
VIOLENCE (1999).
42. GROSSMAN, supra note 42, at 250 ("In World War II, 75 to 80 percent of riflemen did
not fire their weapons at an exposed enemy, even to save their lives and the lives of their
friends.... In Vietnam, the nonfiring rate was close to 5 percent."); GROSSMAN &
DEGAETANO, supra note 42, at 72 (In World War II, "[t]he firing rate was a mere 15 percent
among riflemen ....").
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He and coauthor Gloria DeGaetano also argue that the games
provide deadly skill. To illustrate this point, they describe the shoot-
ings at Heath High School near Paducah, Kentucky by student Mi-
chael Carneal.43 Carneal was said by his attorney to have had "no
appreciable exposure to firearms,"' 4 yet, with eight 45 or nine46 shots,
he had eight hits, all in the head or upper torso. That level of accuracy
with a handgun is astounding. "The FBI says that the average experi-
enced law enforcement officer, in the average shootout, at an average
range of seven yards, hits with approximately one bullet in five. '47
While lacking firearms training, Carneal did play first person shooter
video games, and they appear to have made him an effective killer.
Grossman and DeGaetano describe the events:
[Carneal] never moved his feet during his rampage. He never fired
far to the right or left, never far up or down. He simply fired once
at everything that popped up on his "screen." It is not natural to
fire once at each target. The normal, almost universal, response is
to fire at a target until it drops and then move on to the next target.
This is the defensive reaction that will save our lives, the human in-
stinctual reaction-eliminate the threat quickly. Not to shoot once
and go on to another target before the first target has been elimi-
nated. But most video games teach you to fire at each target only
once, hitting as many targets as you can as fast as you can in order
to rack up a high score. And many video games give bonus effects
... for head shots.48
Later shootings in Jonesboro, Arkansas, by thirteen-year-old
Mitchell Johnson and eleven-year-old Andrew Golden, also implicate
video game training. Both boys played violent video games, although
one of them also had firearm experience. 49 Again, Grossman and
DeGaetano describe the incident:
These two avid video game players fired a combined total of
twenty-seven shots over a range of over one hundred yards and hit
fifteen people. They strategically trapped their victims, lined them
up, and shot with deadly accuracy. Battle-scarred veterans and mili-
tary analysts reacted with amazement at the accuracy of their
shooting, on one hand, and the military strategy involved in setting
43. GROSSMAN & DEGAETANO, supra note 42, at 4,75-76.
44. See John Cheves, Do Violent Images Cause Violent Action? Heath Parents' Lawsuit
Must Prove Direct Link, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, May 2,1999, at Al.
45. See id.; GROSSMAN & DEGAETANO, supra note 42, at 75.
46. See James Prichard, Suit Blames Hollywood, Net for Heath Shootings, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Apr. 13, 1999, at Al.
47. GROSSMAN & DEGAETANO, supra note 42, at 4.
48. Id. at 75-76.
49. Id. at 76.
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up their "kill zone," on the other. Both skills are taught in an array
of home and arcade video games.5 0
The special dangers of violent video games might lead a court to
conclude that restrictions on access by minors meet strict scrutiny,5 1
despite Judge Posner's rejection of the approach. It appears unlikely,
however, that courts will conclude that restrictions on passive media
meet strict scrutiny. Thus, limitations on film remain a problem, and
restrictions on video games may face the same difficulties.
One approach to placing violent media on the same plane as sex-
ual material and allowing the shielding of minors is to argue that vio-
lence should be seen as fitting into the same First Amendment
category as sex. It is the obscenity exception to the First Amendment,
and its corollary of obscenity for child audiences, that allow the re-
strictions on youth distribution upheld in Ginsberg. I have argued
elsewhere that, properly understood, the exception should include
sufficiently graphic and offensive violence, that the limitation of the
category of obscenity to sex is a product of the Victorian era, and that
the concept and case law in earlier eras, as well as the theoretical jus-
tifications for the exception, would encompass violence. 2 Recognizing
that violence, without regard to sexual content, can be obscene would
justify the adoption of the same sort of variable obscenity established
in Ginsberg and allow the limiting of minor access to material more
suited to adults. It was the adoption of this theory that led the federal
district court to refuse to enjoin the enforcement of an Indianapolis
ordinance limiting youth access to violent video games,53 and it was
the rejection of the theory by Judge Posner that contributed to the
reversal of the district court in that same case.54
B. Hate Speech
There is another area, one that Etzioni does not discuss, where
the constitutional problem may not be in the spillover effect when
minors are denied materials, but rather in the protection of materials
50. Id. at 76-77.
51. For a further discussion of violent video games and the strict scrutiny test, see Kevin W.
Saunders, Regulating Youth Access to Violent Video Games: Three Responses to First Amend-
ment Concerns, 2003 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 51, 61-78.
52. See KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY: LIMITING THE MEDIA'S FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION (1996).
53. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
54. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. de-
nied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001).
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for minors. That is the area of hate speech. A racist child is of ques-
tionable psychological health, and the existence of hate-based crime
demonstrates the danger of racism to community safety, so attempts
to teach racism to children harm both the psychological health of
children and the physical safety of society.
The Anti-Defamation League ("ADL") identifies an organiza-
tion engaged in teaching children such racist beliefs. Resistance Re-
cords is "a thinly disguised mouthpiece for the most dangerous
organized hate group in America," the National Alliance.55 Resis-
tance Records has a catalog of approximately 250 titles of hate-filled
music CDs. The music groups include "Aggravated Assault," "Nordic
Thunder," "Angry Aryans," "Brutal Attack," "Plunder & Pillage,"
"Blue-Eyed Devils," and "RaHoWa," a contraction of "Racial Holy
War," and CD titles include "Racially Motivated Violence," "Holo-
caust 2000," "Retribution," "Born to Hate," and "On the Attack. '5 6
Song titles include "Race Riot," "Third Reich," and "White Revolu-
tion." 57
Resistance Records has, in its distribution operations, recently
combined hate speech with all the dangers of violent video games.
"Ethnic Cleansing" lets a game player choose to be either a skinhead
or a Klan member.58 The player roams a virtual city killing gangs of
"subhumans"-African Americans and Hispanic Americans. 9 The
goal is to work one's way to the subway and search out and destroy
the subhumans' Jewish masters, defeating their plans for world domi-
nation and saving the white race.6°
This hate speech is a tool in the perpetuation of racism. The
ADL, speaking of the leader of Resistance Records, says, "Pierce
believes hate music-with its racist, anti-Semitic and anti-government
messages-can be used simply and effectively to attract troubled
youths. His stated goal is to fill the ranks of the National Alliance
with a new generation of haters. ' 61 The ADL quotes Pierce in ex-
plaining the process of using music to recruit:
55. Anti-Defamation League, Deafening Hate: The Revival of Resistance Records, at
http://www.adl.org/resistance-records/summary.asp (2000).
56. Id. at http://www.adl.org/resistance-records/print.asp.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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As hate rock bands subtly infiltrate mainstream youth culture, they
capitalize on teen-age rebelliousness and channel it into enmity and
fury against "non-Aryans." Pierce has explained, "My aim with re-
sistance music is to give them a rationale for alienation, to help
them understand why they're alienated, to help them understand
the programs and policies behind these alienating conditions, and
to give them a target, a purpose for their anger and rage." Coupled
with these organizations' slick and enticing Web sites, hate rock is
part of a multimedia approach that packs a powerful and seductive
punch. Therein lies the most dangerous threat.61
That is a dangerous threat, the danger of perpetuation of racism
by reaching youth still in the process of developing their personalities
and moral compasses. It is a threat against which our children and
society need protection.
III. A Two-TIERED FIRST AMENDMENT
The approach to allowing protection for children from these
harmful media influences is, as Etzioni argues in his article and as I
argue in a forthcoming book,63 to recognize that the First Amendment
should operate differently for adults and for children. For adults the
freedom of expression should be fully robust. But children should not
have a constitutionally protected right to obtain whatever materials
they may find attractive. Furthermore, the free expression rights of
adults should not include the right to reach an audience of other peo-
ple's children.
William Galston's analysis of constitutional law regarding chil-
dren leads him to the conclusion that the Constitution as currently
construed may allow the accomplishment of what Etzioni wants.64 He
cites Ginsberg as recognizing a difference between the Constitution's
treatment of children and adults,65 and indeed Ginsberg does allow
different treatment. He also cites to FCC v. Pacifica Foundation66 for
the recognition that children may be protected in the broadcast con-
text by requiring the channeling of certain material into hours when
children are less likely to be in the audience. 67 Both cases do provide
62. Id.
63. KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT (forth-
coming Dec. 2003).
64. See William Galston, When Wellbeing Trumps Liberty: Political Theory, Jurisprudence,
and Children's Rights, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 279 (2004).
65. Id. at 293.
66. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
67. Galston, supra note 65, at 295-97.
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support, but the question they leave open is whether the allowed pro-
tection applies only to sexual content or words with a sexual connota-
tion. Ginsberg clearly was tied to obscenity law and simply varied the
level of prurience and offensiveness to tailor it to the audience of mi-
nors. Pacifica is less clear in its tie to sex, but there is a strong argu-
ment that the material that must be channeled has to be sexually
indecent rather than objectionable for some other reason.68 If there
must be a tie to sex, then Etzioni is correct that the Constitution cur-
rently leaves children vulnerable in other contexts.
Galston also, however, draws support from another case having
nothing to do with sex. Prince v. Massachusetts allowed a criminal
charge against a woman who allowed, and provided the material for,
her niece to distribute literature for the Jehovah's Witnesses.69 The
Court concluded that the state's interest in protecting children could
override the religious liberties of either the aunt or the niece. 0 This is
a far more generalizable case, and it does not stand alone. There are a
number of cases regarding religious liberty that treat children differ-
ently, particularly in the area of refusing life-saving medical treat-
ment. Generally, an adult will be allowed to refuse medical treatment,
but a court will order life-saving treatment for a child.71 There are also
differences in treatment in other areas, such as procedures required
for commitment.7 1 While this may not show that the constitutional
status quo is adequate for Etzioni's purpose, it is at least an argument
by analogy for the recognition of Etzioni's and my call for different
treatment in the area of free expression. This proposal would still
require an analysis of First Amendment values to determine whether
they can give way in the same manner that religious liberty values
gave way in Prince.
The values behind the First Amendment make the costs that ac-
company free expression worth bearing, but where children are con-
cerned, the benefits are not as strong and the costs are greater.
Children are still developing intellectually and emotionally, and influ-
6& See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Televised Violence: First Amendment
Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123, 1286-87 (1978).
69. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
70. Id. at 166-67.
71. For a discussion of the cases in the area, see Elizabeth A. Lingle, Treating Children by
Faith: Colliding Constitutional Issues, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 301 (1996); Anne D. Lederman, Un-
derstanding Faith: When Religious Parents Decline Conventional Medical Treatment for Their
Children, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 891 (1995).
72. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); see generally SAUNDERS, supra note 64, at ch.
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ences that might be minor for adults can have a serious negative im-
pact on a child. These lessened benefits and greater costs should serve
to weaken the general presumption against censorship and allow so-
ciety to provide protection for children. Etzioni argues for treating
different-aged children differently. I rely on a simple distinction be-
tween minors, or those under seventeen, and adults for constitutional
purposes, but agree that an understanding of the development of
children should lead to differences in the actual limitations justified
by the more general constitutional argument.
While some of the costs that favor restricting expressions for chil-
dren have been discussed, the benefits of free expression should also
be examined to see why they have less value for children.
A. Politics and the Marketplace of Ideas
The most important benefits protected by the First Amend-
ment's expression clauses are those that speak to the people's role in
self-governance. If we cannot hear the views of others, we cannot cast
intelligent ballots. If we cannot speak against government, we cannot
change the views of the polity. If we put restraints on the marketplace
of ideas, the search for truth is cut off-or at least narrowed.
The role of expression in the political process speaks in favor of a
strong freedom of expression, but its importance is most clear for
those who are allowed to participate in the political system. Since
children are not allowed to vote, this rationale is weakened when they
are the intended consumers of speech. Adult attempts to influence
politics should be directed toward other adults, who can vote for the
position advocated. While children's expression relating to social and
political change may have some value, especially for older children,
that value must be less than adult contributions, or denying children
the vote would not be justified.
Despite this argument that the expression rights of children are
of less importance to the political process, they are not completely
without importance. Claims of a right for adults to influence the chil-
dren of others may have little credibility, but the expression of chil-
dren themselves has more value. On some factual issues, such as child
abuse, the child may have unique knowledge and must be heard.
Children must also learn the role they will take on as active members
of the voting political community. There is a societal interest in assur-
ing that children are prepared for this, and learning to express them-
selves on political topics is a part of that preparation. It is, however, a
2004]
HeinOnline -- 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 271 2004
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
training interest, an instrumental interest rather than an intrinsic
right.73 As such, society should be allowed to balance it against other
concerns in the upbringing of children. 74
Macleod also speaks to a value in free expression for children
that touches on this training or developmental interest.75 He phrases it
as an interest on the part of children to access information and condi-
tions that foster independent deliberation and reflection and the de-
velopment of moral powers. Whether this is an individual interest, as
he seems to conclude, or a societal interest, it still seems to be a train-
ing interest and one that can yield to other interests. The difference in
where the interest lies would be most important in determining which
interests can serve to override the free expression interest. If it is the
child's training interest that is important, and Buss is clear in her posi-
tion that the child has an interest in working out his or her own iden-
tity and system of beliefs,76 then it is the child's own interests that may
serve as a counterweight. If the training interest is society's, other
societal interests can override free expression. There do seem to be
informational interests that are the child's, and material with serious
value for the child should remain available, as the CDA, COPA, and
a variety of other restrictive statutes have provided.
The "marketplace of ideas" model of free expression also speaks
less strongly for expression to and from children. While we may be-
lieve that the free and open exchange of ideas among adults will even-
tually lead to the truth, that seems less likely for children. Children
lack the experiential basis of adults and are more likely to be led
astray. We may also be more confident in concluding that the direc-
tion in which the child is headed is wrong. It is unreasonable to claim
the general infallibility that would justify the suppression of contrary
adult expression, but it is more reasonable to claim a better under-
standing than that possessed by children.
David Archard notes this difference in capacity between children
and adults.77 He asserts that children do not hold beliefs or have de-
sires in the same way adults do, and thus, self-expression does not
have the same value for children. He does recognize value in their
expression of these half-formed beliefs and rapidly changing desires,
73. See JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 106 (1996).
74. For a limitation, see infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
75. See Macleod, supra note 28.
76. See Buss, supra note 20.
77. See David Archard, Free Speech and Children's Interests, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 83
(2004).
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but not to the degree of adult expression of belief or desire. So free
expression rights for children need not exist, or at least can exist on a
lower plane than the free expression rights of adults. Archard does
note the right of children under Article 12 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child to express views on matters
affecting the child, but suggests that this right is instrumental rather
than intrinsic.78
There is the danger that government could use the right to limit
the expression of nonparents to children to impose an orthodoxy on
the next generation. To prevent such an imposition, it is important to
recognize the right of parents to provide their children with material
that society may feel unsuitable. Thus, even if restrictions on the
commercial distribution of violent material or hate-filled music to
children are acceptable, parents must be free to purchase the materi-
als their children cannot buy directly. The schools must also not be
used to restrict one side in an ongoing political debate in the adult
community. While schools should be allowed to insist on civility and
to prohibit racist invective, they should not be allowed to assert one
position on affirmative action and to ban the expression of contrary
opinion. This was the real harm in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District.9 There was, in society, an ongoing debate
in the adult community over the conflict in Vietnam. The Des Moines
schools banned a form of expression against the war, while doing
nothing to restrict speech in favor of the war or on other political top-
ics.80 It was an attempt to squelch one side of a debate and only allow
the expression of the other.
The article by Michael Birnhack and Jacob Rowbottom discusses
Internet filtering but also speaks indirectly to the point of children's
speech in a democracy.81 They note differences between United States
and European law regarding free expression. The European legal
ethos of compromise and balancing, they argue, is more supportive of
attempts to shield children. While their discussion is in the context of
balancing adult rights against the recognized interest in protecting
children from pornography, the value of comparative constitutional
analysis is more generalizable. Birnhack and Rowbottom show how
78. Id. at 93.
79. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
80. Id. at 510-11.
81. See Michael D. Birnhack & Jacob H. Rowbottom, Shielding Children: The European
Way, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 175 (2004).
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balancing adult rights against the interest in protecting children can
take place in democratic countries. There is, then, comparative evi-
dence that limits placed on the provision of objectionable material to
children would not destroy our democratic system.
B. Autonomy
Other justifications for free expression rest on the value of
autonomy. Even speech that has no political value has value in the
part it plays in self-definition. Those who argue that sexually obscene
material should be protected do so not on the basis of political value,
since material with serious political value is not obscene. Rather, the
argument is that individuals have the right to determine for them-
selves the material they will read, view, or convey. As long as there is
no harm to others, individuals must be free to experiment, to find the
life style that they find most satisfactory, and to define themselves.
Edwin Baker is one of the leading current proponents of such a
theory. He argues that a fundamental purpose behind the First
Amendment is fostering "individual self-fulfillment." 82 Baker says
that each of us has a right to self-realization and self-determination,
and that part of self-definition is the freedom to express any thoughts
we may have. This freedom goes beyond political expression, and
Baker would protect telling stories purely for entertainment and sing-
ing purely to demonstrate musical accomplishment.83
David Richards relies on similar values:
[P]eople are not to be constrained to communicate or not to com-
municate, to believe or not to believe, to associate or not to associ-
ate. The value placed on this cluster of ideas derives from the
notion of self-respect that comes from a mature person's full and
untrammeled exercise of capacities central to human rationality....
Freedom of expression.. .supports a mature individual's sovereign
autonomy in deciding how to communicate with others; it disfavors
restrictions on communication imposed for the sake of the distort-
ing rigidities of the orthodox and the established. In so doing, it
nurtures and sustains the self-respect of the mature person.84
82. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47 (1989) [herein-
after BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY]; C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978). Martin Redish goes so far as to assert that this self-
realization value is the only true value served by the freedom of expression. The values behind
democracy itself are only an outgrowth of the value of self-realization. See Martin H. Redish,
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593-94 (1982).
83. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 83, at 54.
84. David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974) (emphasis added and citations omitted).
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Note, however, that Richards seems to recognize that autonomy
interests do not apply, at least with equal strength, to children. Adults
may be presumed to know what is in their own best interests and how
best to communicate their ideas to others. For younger children,
however, others may know better.
Baker and Richards see the protection of free expression as part
of the broader right to freedom from government interference in
making self-defining decisions. Their position grows out of a tradition
tracing back to the work of John Stuart Mill. While Mill's On Liberty
justifies free speech based on its utility in attaining truth, the aspect of
Mill's theory on which autonomy arguments build is found elsewhere
in On Liberty.85 Mill finds attempts by society to control the lifestyle
decisions of individuals unjustified, except to prevent harms to others.
If there is no harm to others, Mill says "neither one person, nor any
number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature
of ripe years that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what
he chooses to do with it. ''86
Mill did, however, recognize a difference between children and
adults. The quote above spoke of persons "of ripe years." Mill would
allow greater restrictions on children. This may be best shown in
Mill's consideration of possible rationales for society acting paternal-
istically toward adults. Mill found punishment for purely self-
regarding behavior by adults unacceptable in part because society has
other ways of leading "weaker members" toward expected standards
of conduct:
Society has had absolute power over them during all the early por-
tion of their existence; it has had the whole period of childhood and
nonage in which to try whether it could make them capable of ra-
tional conduct in life. The existing generation is master both of the
training and the entire circumstances of the generation to
come .... If society lets any considerable number of its members
grow up mere children,... society has itself to blame for the conse-
quences. 87
Mill was willing to allow society to shape the thinking of children
in a way that would be unacceptable for adults. In childhood, society
has the opportunity to teach values it hopes children will accept as
they become adults, and requiring society to allow strangers to the
85. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. IV (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books
1974) (1859).
86. Id. at 142.
87. Id. at 149-50.
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child to teach opposing values defeats society's right to educate. Soci-
ety should continue to recognize the primary role of parents in teach-
ing values, but it does not have to allow the magazine or video dealer
or the video arcade operator to offer fare to children that society
finds harmful and that the parents do not make the effort themselves
to provide their children.
CONCLUSION
Limiting the rights of children to obtain whatever material they
find attractive and the rights of strangers to the children to provide
them whatever they wish to sell serves to strengthen the role and
rights of parents. Parents have the right, and responsibility, to deter-
mine the influences to which their children are exposed. 88 But, parents
need help. Children are subjected to a great many influences, from
videos to cable television to video games to the Internet, and the
greater explicitness of both sex and violence in the current media
make the concern over inappropriate exposure pressing.
The government's role in this area should be supportive of the
parents. The argument presented here is only that the government be
allowed to make decisions as to what the child can obtain directly
from nonparents. Parents must be allowed to disagree with the state
and purchase and provide the material to their children themselves.
The effect is only a change in presumptions. The current presumption
is that it is acceptable for the vendor to provide nonobscene material
to minors, and that it is up to the parents to control their children if
they do not want their children exposed to influences they find objec-
tionable. The changed presumption would be that there are materials
for which it is assumed that the parents would object and that vendors
may not provide minors, but parents can counter that presumption by
purchasing the material and providing it to their children themselves.
It should be noted that the usual concerns over slippery slopes,
raised whenever there is a suggestion that some form of speech be
limited, are not compelling here. Recognition of an exception to the
First Amendment that would allow the prohibition of flag burning
88. Judge Posner, in American Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001), argued that children have expression rights inde-
pendent of their parents so that they may cast their own independent votes when they come of
age. If Judge Posner's position is limited to the ordinance at issue in that case, an ordinance that
limited the access of those under eighteen, his conclusion may be reasonable and would speak in
favor of limitations addressed only to those under seventeen. If his position reaches those under
seventeen, it is in conflict with the Supreme Court's views, as expressed in Ginsberg.
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might lead to exceptions placing other forms of expression outside the
protection of the amendment. Indeed, having amended the Constitu-
tion to recognize one exception, a politician might find it more diffi-
cult to resist demands to do so again. The same is not true for an age-
based exception. While there may be debate over what age during the
period of minority to make subject to particular limitations, with our
current views on the rights of adulthood-with the exception of the
consumption of alcohol- attaching at eighteen makes it inconceivable
that the limitations suggested would creep up to twenty-one on the
way to thirty or forty. While there might be creep in the nature of the
material subject to restriction, the restrictions are, again, only pre-
sumptions. Parents can always act contrary to the restriction on direct
provision by others and obtain the materials for their children.
This last response also speaks to concerns over a chilling effect.
Any restrictions on free expression may affect materials that are not
the intended or legitimate targets of the restrictions. Vendors may be
unwilling to face the risk that the materials they are providing will
turn out to be restricted, and material that should be freely available
is kept off the market. Where the restrictions are only on direct dis-
tribution to children, the concern is of lesser import. If a video dealer
decides not to sell or rent a particular video to a minor, the child's
parents can still obtain it for the child. The effect will only be on ques-
tionable, borderline material, and the decision there is then placed
where it should be-with the parents.
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